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Despite a growing awareness that mistaken eyewitness
identifications contribute significantly to wrongful convictions, most
courts continue to apply federal Due Process criteria for admissibility of
eyewitness identification that has proved useless in protecting against
the use of highly unreliable evidence. In response, this article reviews
the path-breaking decisions of several state supreme courts that have
blazed their own trail. It explores the issues that courts have addressed,
the rules they have devised, and the legal grounds for their decisions,
and from this, concludes that state supreme courts can implement
appropriate criteria that would in fact promote accuracy and fairness in
the use of eyewitness identification.
What is it that I do when I decide a case? To what sources of
information do I appeal for guidance? In what proportions do I permit
them to contribute to the result? In what proportions ought they to
contribute? If a precedent is applicable, when do I refuse to follow it?
BENJAMIN N. CARDozo, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 10
(1921).
Let's face it-the media reports of wrongly convicted people, released after
years in custody, often because eyewitnesses made mistakes in identifying them,
are downright terrifying. For advocates of Due Process in the criminal justice
system, like those working in innocence projects, it is terrifying to imagine all the
innocent people languishing in prisons whose names will never be cleared due to a
lack of DNA or other exonerating evidence.' For law enforcement officials (many
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I Studies of exonerations and the causes of wrongful convictions lead inexorably to the
conclusion that countless wrongly convicted people will never be exonerated. For a sampling of the
rich literature on wrongful convictions, see, e.g., Brandon L. Garrett, Judging Innocence, 108
COLUM. L. REv. 55, 121 (2008); Samuel R. Gross, Convicting the Innocent, 4 ANN. REv. L. & Soc.
Sci. 173 (2008) (addressing the rate of false convictions and surveying types of wrongful convictions
cases); Samuel R. Gross et al., Exonerations in the United States, 1989 Through 2003, 95 J. CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 523, 524 (2005) (reporting on study of 340 exonerations); Sandra Guerra
Thompson, Beyond a Reasonable Doubt? Reconsidering Uncorroborated Eyewitness Identification
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of whom are also concerned about wrongful convictions), it is a terrifying prospect
that reformers may push through new rules that would make it harder to obtain
identification evidence, and hence, convictions. 2  If we take social science
seriously and take a hard look at violent crime cases being decided today, the
conclusion is irrefutable: erroneous eyewitness identifications continue to bring
about wrongful convictions. 3 Some procedural improvements have been made on
a statewide basis through legislative reforms, of which North Carolina is the most
notable example.4 Law enforcement authorities have made other significant
improvements on a local or statewide basis as well.5 Clearly, rules adopted at a
statewide level will bring about the kind of change needed to raise the quality of
identification evidence, whereas waiting for local police departments nationwide to
adopt the needed reforms of their own initiative would be sheer folly. 6 In the final
Testimony, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1487, 1491 (2008) (suggesting that "untold numbers of additional
innocent people have been punished for crimes they did not commit").
2 See Daniel L. Schacter et al., Policy Forum: Studying Eyewitness Investigations in the
Field, 32 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 3, 3 (2008) (discussing Illinois law enforcement's field study findings
purporting to contradict laboratory findings on sequential lineups); Andrew M. Siegel, Moving Down
the Wedge of Injustice: A Proposal for a Third Generation of Wrongful Convictions Scholarship and
Advocacy, 42 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1219, 1221 (2005) (addressing the resistance shown by law
enforcement and prosecutors to innocence reforms based on arguments that wrongful convictions are
aberrational and that the social costs of reforms outweigh the benefits); Thompson, supra note 1, at
1520 (addressing "deeply ingrained culture [within police departments] that resists change and is
skeptical of new procedures," especially those that may make it harder to collect usable evidence).
3 The proof is syllogistic: (1) Police practices and legal rules produced hundreds of wrongful
convictions in violent crime cases in the past; (2) Police practices and legal rules remain unchanged;
(3) Therefore, wrongful convictions continue to be handed down in violent crime cases. The only
difference is that DNA evidence now excludes wrongfully identified suspects in most sexual assault
cases. See Steven B. Duke, Ann Seung-Eun Lee & Chet K.W. Pager, A Picture's Worth a Thousand
Words: Conversational Versus Eyewitness Testimony in Criminal Convictions, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
1, 6 & n.21 (2007) (using Justice Department statistics to estimate that eyewitness identification
errors account for 4,000 or more false convictions annually in the United States).
4 See infra note 108.
5 See The Innocence Project, Fix the System: Priority Issues: Eyewitness Identification,
http://www.innocenceproject.org/fix/Eyewitness-Identification.php (last visited Apr. 7, 2010)
(providing links to statement of best practices developed by Wisconsin Attorney General, reformed
procedural requirements developed by Attorney General of New Jersey, and reforms implemented by
law enforcement in several localities).
6 As of 2004, there were 17,876 independent state and local law enforcement agencies in the
United States and another 513 federal law enforcement agencies. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SOURCEBOOK OF JUSTICE STATISTICS (2007), available at
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/csllea04.pdf. Due to the lack of national accreditation
standards for law enforcement, the only other sources of wide-scale implementation are federal
constitutional requirements and statewide regulation by legislation or state high court remedies. See
JOHN KLEINIG, THE ETHICS OF POLICING 36-37 (1996) (noting that only a fraction of police
departments have sought accreditation).
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analysis, even the steady stream of exonerations has yielded little reform from
legislatures and law enforcement.7
What can courts do to better protect against wrongful convictions? After all,
the courts are directly responsible for providing fair trials when prosecutors move
forward with criminal charges. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court's Due Process
test has utterly failed to provide any meaningful protection against suggestive
police practices or the use of otherwise unreliable identification evidence. 8 State
supreme courts are, of course, free to depart from the federal standard in
interpreting their state constitutions, and they possess other powers to supervise the
administration of justice and control the admission of evidence.9 Yet only a
handful of state supreme courts have endeavored to fill the void, doing so in a
variety of ways, most of which constitute minor improvements to the Supreme
Court's test.10 Why have the vast majority of state high courts taken such a laissez
faire position, given the growing awareness of mistaken identifications leading to
wrongful convictions?
The answer is complex. One part of the answer lies in the institutional
constraints that many judges believe prevent them from participating more actively
in improving the quality of identification evidence. Put simply, courts are not in
the business of "legislating from the bench.""
The second impediment to judicial involvement in setting new requirements
for eyewitness identification evidence is the sheer complexity of the problem.
Social science sheds light on numerous problems with eyewitness identification, 2
but it is not necessarily clear what rules would best respond to these problems. For
7 See Sandra Guerra Thompson, Judicial Blindness to Eyewitness Misidentification, 93
MARQ. L. REV. (forthcoming 2010) [hereinafter Thompson, Judicial Blindness] (reporting that in a
year-long study of state appellate decisions on eyewitness identifications and Due Process, all states
in the study had adopted the federal standard for purposes of interpreting their state constitutions);
Sandra Guerra Thompson, What Price Justice? The Importance of Costs to Eyewitness Identification
Reform, 41 TEx. TECH L. REV. 33, 33-55 (2008) [hereinafter Thompson, What Price Justice?]
(reviewing the key reforms that have been proposed and the few states that have implemented them).
8 See infra Part I.
9 See infra notes 109-12, 158 and accompanying text.
'0 See infra Part II.
" See infra notes 173-75 and accompanying text.
12 1 assume the validity of the massive body of social science research in the area of
eyewitness identifications, some of it done by leading researchers who have devoted decades to their
work. However, at a recent SEALS Conference, Professor Andrew E. Taslitz of Howard University
School of Law recounted a story about his having delivered a lecture on eyewitness identifications at
a judicial conference. During the question and answer session, one judge rhetorically asked, "When
you say 'science,' you actually mean 'social science?"' To this the audience of judges applauded
enthusiastically, indicating their lack of faith in the scientific findings of eyewitness identification
research. Andrew E. Taslitz, Remarks at the Southeastern Association of Law Schools 62nd Annual
Meeting (Aug. 3, 2009). This type of attitude toward the research of psychologists among members
of the legal profession dates back at least to the early 20' century, especially as it relates to
eyewitness identification research. See Wallace D. Loh, Psycholegal Research: Past and Present, 79
MICH. L. REV. 659, 660-63 (1981).
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example, studies show unequivocally that people of all races are less accurate in
identifying strangers of a different race than their own.13 In addition, researchers
have identified numerous other factors that can affect the accuracy of an
eyewitness's identification of a stranger in the circumstances that typically attend
violent crimes. 14  To make matters worse, often several factors that reduce
reliability are at play in a single case at the same time-the victim and defendant
are of different races, the witness has a brief period of time for viewing the culprit,
the crime is committed at night making viewing more difficult, and the witness has
a tendency to focus on a weapon if the culprit brandishes one. Exactly how should
the law respond to these problems? Can an eyewitness be relied upon to make an
accurate identification under such circumstances at all?' 5  Should experts be
permitted to testify as a matter of course, do jury instructions remedy the problem,
or is some other remedy appropriate?
Further complicating the gathering of identification evidence is the problem
of suggestiveness that can be introduced by first-responders and law enforcement
officials.' 6 For example, when the police show only a single suspect to a witness
(what is known as a "show-up"), experts agree this procedure is inherently
suggestive,' 7 but there may be good reasons such as exigent circumstances for
allowing show-ups. Again, the question is: what is the proper legal rule?
The multidimensional nature of the problem with eyewitness identification
evidence and the numerous and varied reform proposals 8 make it harder to gain
consensus on the correct course of action. Add to the confusion the fear that
13 See infra note 86.
14 See ELIZABETH F. LOFTUS, JAMES M. DOYLE & JENNIFER E. DYSART, EYEWITNEss
TESTIMONY: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL 16-36 (4th ed. 2007) (addressing effects of lighting, violence,
stress and fear, and weapon focus); Gary L. Wells & Elizabeth A. Olson, Eyewitness Testimony, 54
ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 277, 280-82 (2003) (eyewitness accuracy can be affected by many factors
including lighting conditions, amount of time a subject is viewed, whether the subject wears a
disguise, lessened ability to recognize a person of a different race, and presence of a weapon, among
others).
15 Some legal scholars have called for serious restrictions, and even an outright ban, on the
use of eyewitness identification testimony to obtain convictions. See Noah Clements, Flipping a
Coin: A Solution for the Inherent Unreliability of Eyewitness Identification Testimony, 40 IND. L.
REV. 271 (2007) (proposing blanket exclusion of eyewitness identification testimony in criminal
cases); Thompson, supra note 1, at 1497 (calling for a corroboration requirement for admission of
eyewitness identification testimony).
16 The Department of Justice's influential guide for law enforcement on eyewitness
identification evidence calls for non-suggestive questioning of witnesses throughout the investigation,
beginning with conversations with first-responders, as any suggestive questioning can distort a
witness's memory of the event. See NAT'L INST. OF JUSTICE, U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., EYEwrNESS
EVIDENCE: A GUIDE FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT 9, 13, 15, 21, 23 (1999).
17 See Bruce W. Behrman & Sherrie L. Davey, Eyewitness Identification in Actual Criminal
Cases: An Archival Analysis, 25 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 475, 487 (2001) (finding studies of actual
cases to confirm laboratory findings that show-ups are more suggestive than lineups).
18 See generally Thompson, What Price Justice?, supra note 7 (reviewing reform proposals
for eyewitness identification practices).
606 [Vol 7:603
EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATIONS AND STATE COURTS
violent criminals may be wrongly acquitted over doubts regarding identifications if
rules become too restrictive or complicated, and it is perhaps no surprise that most
state courts take the route of avoidance. 19 But not all do, which is where this
article comes in.
This article reviews the path-breaking decisions of several state supreme
courts on eyewitness identification evidence. It explores the issues that courts
have addressed, the rules they have devised, and the legal grounds for their
decisions. While each of these decisions represents a novel (and in some cases
politically risky) approach, viewed in totality, the national situation is still bleak.
What we find are a handful of cases in which courts take some steps to provide
remedies after acknowledging the scientific findings on the problems associated
with identification evidence. To date it is a piecemeal and painstakingly slow
approach to reform on a national basis: a rule for show-ups in Wisconsin, a change
in the Due Process test in Utah, a requirement for certain jury instructions in
Georgia, etc. 20 Each of these decisions should be applauded for its contribution in
improving the fairness of criminal trials, but so much more is needed, even in those
states. The aim of this article is to shed some light on the different ways in which
state supreme courts can do their part to set statewide standards that promote
accuracy and fairness in the use of eyewitness identification evidence.
Part I of this article briefly outlines and critiques the Supreme Court's
jurisprudence on eyewitness identifications and Due Process. It treads on ground
well-worn by scholars who have for decades decried the Supreme Court's failure
to provide a Due Process test that would protect against the use of highly
unreliable identification evidence. 2' Scholars have also noted the inconsistency
between the scientific literature on eyewitness identification and the Supreme
Court's multi-factor reliability test.22 This article takes the novel approach of re-
19 See infra note 106 and accompanying text.
20 For discussions of each of the state supreme court decisions in these states, see infra Part II.
2 1 Almost since the moment the Court decided its Due Process cases, some scholars
recognized the failures of the federal Due Process test and the danger of wrongful conviction. See,
e.g., Joseph D. Grano, Kirby, Biggers, and Ash: Do Any Constitutional Safeguards Remain Against
the Danger of Convicting the Innocent?, 72 MICH. L. REV. 717 (1974). To this day, scholars continue
to decry the Court's decisions and to call for change. See Timothy P. O'Toole & Giovanna Shay,
Manson v. Brathwaite Revisited: Towards a New Rule of Decision for Due Process Challenges to
Eyewitness Identification Procedures, 41 VAL. U. L. REv. 109, 110 (2006) ("Sadly, the rule of
decision set out in Manson has failed to meet the Court's objective of furthering fairness and
reliability. The results have been tragic."); Id. 114 n.39 (citing articles critical of the federal Due
Process test); Richard A. Wise, Kirsten A. Dauphinais & Martin A. Safer, A Tripartite Solution to
Eyewitness Error, 97 J. CRim. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 807, 812-15 (2007) (noting Supreme Court's
decisions favor admission of identification testimony even when suggestive practices are followed).
22 See, e.g., Michael R. Headley, Note, Long on Substance, Short on Process: An Appeal for
Process Long Overdue in Eyewitness Lineup Procedures, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 681, 684 (2002) (arguing
that courts should incorporate scientific research on eyewitness identifications into Due Process
analysis); Ruth Yacona, Comment, Manson v. Brathwaite: The Supreme Court's Misunderstanding of
Eyewitness Identification, 39 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 539 (2006).
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evaluating the facts of the Supreme Court's leading decisions in light of the
scientific findings on reliability. More importantly, rather than simply calling for
course correction by the Supreme Court, this article takes the position that the
situation may be better suited to state actors-judicial, legislative, and executive. 3
In particular, Part II explores the role that state appellate courts can play in
developing a jurisprudence of eyewitness identification evidence that both
incorporates social science research and carefully balances the interests of law
enforcement and the accused. While state high courts do not have the authority to
develop comprehensive guidelines for law enforcement practices in obtaining
identification evidence, courts do have vast powers to affect change through the
state's constitutional jurisprudence and by other means as well.
Part III argues that state supreme courts are well-suited to take an active part
in the "laboratory" model of criminal justice that characterizes our federalist
system. Indeed, because judges have ethical and professional responsibilities for
protecting constitutional and civil rights as well as protecting the integrity of the
administration of criminal justice, it is incumbent on state supreme courts to show
leadership in developing solutions to the problems that plague the area of
eyewitness identification evidence.
I. THE MANY FAILURES OF FEDERAL DUE PROCESS JURISPRUDENCE
It is fascinating to read the Supreme Court's Due Process jurisprudence on
eyewitness identifications-now well over thirty years old-from a perspective
which is informed by the lessons of hundreds of wrongful convictions 24 and by the
massive body of social science literature that has since developed.25 Long before
the advent- of DNA evidence and the release of so many wrongly convicted
people, 26 a rich dialogue had existed in the jurisprudence of eyewitness
identifications about the risks of misidentification and the role the courts should
play in protecting the innocent.27 In the early 1970's, federal district and circuit
23 I have previously called on legislatures to adopt comprehensive reform measures at the
state level. See Thompson, What Price Justice?, supra note 7; see also Margery Malkin Koosed, The
Proposed Innocence Protection Act Won't-Unless It Also Curbs Mistaken Eyewitness
Identifications, 63 OHIo ST. L.J. 263 (2002) (calling for legislative measures to assure greater
reliability of eyewitness identification testimony in capital cases).
24 See The Innocence Project, http://www.innocenceproject.org/know (last visited on Apr. 7,
2010) (citing 252 exonerations by DNA evidence as of April 7, 2010). Hundreds have been
exonerated by other means as well. See Gross et al., supra note 1, at 524 (reporting on study of 340
exonerations, a little less than half cleared by DNA evidence).
25 For a sample of this literature, see supra note 14 and infra notes 38, 40, 43-45.
26 See supra note I.
27 The Supreme Court in Manson v. Brathwaite noted that some courts of appeal had
developed a Due Process approach that required exclusion of any identification evidence that was the
product of impermissibly suggestive procedures. 432 U.S. 98, 110 (1977). The Court reversed the
Second Circuit's decision in which it found error in the admission of identification testimony. Id. at
108-09, 117. In Neil v. Biggers, the Supreme Court reversed the Sixth Circuit's decision which had
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courts were apparently more inclined than now to exclude identification testimony
on Due Process grounds.28 In Manson v. Brathwaite, the Supreme Court, clearly
signaling its intent to take a hands-off approach, reversed several such decisions
and, in the process, set in place a "more lenient ' 29 Due Process standard that has
failed to provide any meaningful protection against wrongful convictions, despite
the fact that the Court declared reliability to be the "linchpin" of its approach.3°
Upon a showing that the identification procedure is impermissibly suggestive,
the Court then considers the "totality of the circumstances" to determine whether
the identification is nonetheless reliable. 31  To assess the totality of the
circumstances, the Court instructs lower courts to consider five factors (taken from
its earlier decision in Neil v. Biggers): "the opportunity of the witness to view the
criminal at the time of the crime, the witness' degree of attention, the accuracy of
his prior description of the criminal, the level of certainty demonstrated at the
confrontation, and the time between the crime and the confrontation.' 32 The Court
also called for the weighing of these factors against "the corrupting effect of the
suggestive identification itself. 3 3 However, courts have generally not undertaken
to measure the extent to which suggestive practices might have undermined
reliability.34 The Supreme Court has not revisited this jurisprudence in the three
decades since it was established, so it continues to govern in federal courts and is
followed in most state courts as well.35
In critiquing Brathwaite, one useful starting point is to inquire whether the
primary purpose of the rule should be to provide adequate protection against
mistaken identification or whether Due Process is limited to curbing improper
police conduct. In other words, what is the nature of a person's Due Process rights
with respect to eyewitness identification evidence? Another issue is whether the
Court's test is consistent with the scientific research. Finally, there is the thorny
question of institutional competence and the propriety of judicial regulation of the
police through rulemaking, as contrasted with a possible legislative solution.
upheld a district court decision to exclude identification testimony on the grounds of impermissible
suggestion. 409 U.S. 188, 190, 201 (1972).
28 See Biggers, 490 U.S. at 190.
29 Brathwaite, 432 U.S. at 110.
30 Id. at 114.
32 Id. at 110-14.
12 Id. at 114.
33 Id.
34 This view was reinforced by the last paragraph of Brathwaite, which reiterated the rule:
"We conclude that the criteria laid down in Biggers are to be applied in determining the admissibility
of evidence offered by the prosecution concerning a post-Stovall identification, and that those criteria
are satisfactorily met and complied with here." 432 U.S. at 117. The Court makes no mention of
balancing these factors against the suggestiveness of the identification procedure, nor does it engage
in this type of balancing in its assessment of the facts of the case. See generally id.
35 See infra note 106.
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The following sections review some of the well-documented problems with
the federal Due Process test for admission of eyewitness identification testimony.
Again, viewed through the lens of thirty years of additional scientific research and
judicial experience applying the Due Process test, the need for jurisprudential
course correction is beyond dispute.
A. Brathwaite Renders Suggestiveness Both a Due Process Requirement and
Beside the Point
The Supreme Court's Due Process test focuses first on the question of police
suggestiveness before turning to the question of reliability.36  If there is no
suggestion introduced by the police procedures, then there is no Due Process
claim.3 7 The test, thus, completely ignores unreliability if there is no evidence of
police suggestion. This is a gaping hole in the protection against mistaken
identification and erroneous conviction. If the Due Process clause serves to protect
against unfair trials due to unreliable evidence, then the Brathwaite test applies too
narrowly. A great deal of unreliability is caused by factors inherent to the
eyewitnesses (age, lighting, weapon-focus, cross-race bias, etc.), which social
scientists call "estimator variables., 38 Even if the police follow non-suggestive
practices, the circumstances under which an eyewitness observes a perpetrator may
be so problematic that the use of the identification evidence at trial could violate
principles of fairness. However, the Supreme Court's Due Process protection only
applies if the defense first crosses the threshold of suggestive police practices.
On the other hand, the rule does take into account police suggestion. Factors
such as police suggestion and other elements of the process that can be controlled
or mitigated by the justice system are referred to as "system variables., 39  A
witness's memory is malleable and can be permanently distorted by suggestion.40
Police suggestion can exacerbate the inherent weaknesses of an eyewitness's
ability to make an accurate identification. When an individual reports witnessing a
36 See Brathwaite, 432 U.S. at 110-14 (describing the more lenient approach that it ultimately
adopts).
37 The Supreme Court's Due Process decisions all involved identification procedures
employed by law enforcement officers, so the Court has not had occasion to consider suggestive
actions on the part of private parties that may affect an eyewitness's identification. Although some
courts have applied the federal Due Process suggestiveness/reliability analysis in cases of suggestive
conduct by private parties, the better answer is that the Court did not intend for the rule to apply to
private conduct. See State v. Chen, 952 A.2d 1094, 1101-02 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2008) (citing
split among federal circuit courts).
38 See Gary L. Wells & Eric P. Seelau, Eyewitness Identification: Psychological Research and
Legal Policy on Lineups, I PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 765, 765-66 (1995); see also supra note 14
(citing other scientific literature on various estimator variables).
39 See Wells & Seelau, supra note 38, at 766.
40 See ELIZABETH F. LoFTus, EYEwrrNEss TESTIMONY 21-22 (1979) (addressing retention and
retrieval stages of long-term memory); Lovrus ET AL., supra note 14, at 65-66 (leading questions
during post-event investigation can cause memory distortion).
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crime, the police will interact with the witness in a variety of ways. A police
officer may suggest-whether consciously or not-that a witness select a certain
person in the identification process.
41
Scientists have shown that other forms of suggestion can also distort a
witness's memory of events. 42 Post-identification confirmatory feedback ("Good,
you identified the actual suspect.") can affect the witness's level of confidence in
the identification.43 It bears mentioning that scientific research also shows that a
witness's initial confidence level in an identification bears no correlation to
accuracy in any case.44 This basic problem is compounded by our misplaced belief
that the witness's confidence level indicates reliability and our failure to account
for suggestive practices that elevate that confidence level over time.
Thus, the use of suggestion infects the identification process in at least three
ways: it can produce false identifications, it can distort a person's memory of the
events, and it can artificially heighten the witness's degree of confidence in the
identification. In addition, the very nature of the pre-trial process can also cause an
eyewitness to feel even more confident in an identification over time, resulting in a
higher level of certainty than what is experienced at the time of the identification.45
In short, suggestion is merely one cause of unreliability, just as a witness's
age and the presence of a weapon have a tendency to reduce reliability.
Suggestion is one possible source of unreliability, yet for purposes of the Due
Process analysis, courts do not reach the reliability question if there is no evidence
of unnecessary suggestiveness by the police.46 Moreover, even if there is
unnecessary suggestion, it is not taken into account by courts in assessing the
reliability of the identification testimony under the Biggers five-factor test.
41 See NAT'L INST. OF JUSTICE, supra note 16, at 9, 13, 15, 21, 23 (calling for non-suggestive
questioning by first-responders and police).
42 See Wise et al., supra note 21, at 816.
43 See BRIAN L. CUTLER & STEVEN D. PENROD, MISTAKEN IDENTIFICATION: THE EYEWITNESS,
PSYCHOLOGY, AND THE LAW 186-90 (1995) (addressing the "malleability of witness confidence");
Amy Bradfield Douglass & Nancy Steblay, Memory Distortion in Eyewitnesses: A Meta-Analysis of
the Post-Identification Feedback Effect, 20 APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 859, 860 (2006); Gary L.
Wells and Amy L. Bradfield, "Good, You Identified the Suspect": Feedback to Eyewitnesses Distorts
Their Reports of the Witnessing Experience, 83 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 360, 374 (1998); Wells &
Murray, infra note 54.
44 Gary L. Wells, R.C.L. Lindsay & Tamara J. Ferguson, Accuracy, Confidence, and Juror
Perceptions in Eyewitness Identification, 64 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 440, 446-47 (1979) (finding that a
witness's "self-rated and overtly expressed confidence is largely irrelevant in determining the
criminal-identification accuracy of an eyewitness," and that jurors' decisions to believe the witness
are highly related to their ratings of the witness's confidence, although the confidence-accuracy
relationship is very poor).
45 Scientists have also found that the nature of the adjudication process and witness
preparation for trial can also artificially increase a witness's stated confidence level. See John S.
Shaw, III & Kimberley A. McClure, Repeated Postevent Questioning Can Lead to Elevated Levels of
Eyewitness Confidence, 20 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 629, 630-31,649-50 (1996).
46 See State v. Chen, 952 A.2d 1094, 1107 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2008).
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Ostensibly, the Supreme Court aimed to balance three interests in adopting
the two-part suggestiveness and reliability rule: (1) to keep unreliable evidence
from the jury 47 (2) to deter the police from unnecessarily suggestive procedures; 48
and (3) to protect the integrity of the criminal justice system.49 The Court rejected
a "per se rule" that would exclude all identification evidence that was the product
of unnecessarily suggestive police procedures. 50 The Court took the view that even
an unnecessarily suggestive procedure could produce reliable evidence, and a per
se exclusionary rule for such identifications would unnecessarily lead to the
exclusion of reliable evidence. As for deterrence, the Court believed its approach
would provide adequate deterrence, so a per se approach would not be necessary.
It was the application of the third factor, however-the concern about the integrity
of the criminal justice process-where the Court found "serious drawbacks" with
the per se exclusionary rule.51 The majority in Brathwaite wrote:
Since it denies the trier reliable evidence, it may result, on occasion, in
the guilty going free .... And in those cases in which the admission of
identification evidence is error under the per se approach but not under
the totality approach--cases in which the identification is reliable despite
an unnecessarily suggestive identification procedure-reversal is a
Draconian sanction. Certainly, inflexible rules of exclusion that may
frustrate rather than promote justice have not been viewed recently by
this Court with unlimited enthusiasm.52
By focusing on the possibility of "the guilty going free" due to the "Draconian
sanction" of excluding identifications produced by unnecessarily suggestive
means, the majority undercut Due Process procedural fairness and showed less
concern for the possibility that the innocent might be convicted.
One might assume that the Supreme Court intended to focus not only on
suggestiveness but on reliability more broadly, but that is not so. Even the
strongest evidence of suggestiveness does not lead to exclusion unless the
identification fails the Court's "reliability" standard, which is oddly divorced from
the suggestiveness standard. Employing this false dichotomy between
suggestiveness and reliability, police suggestion is viewed as a type of wrongdoing
to be punished, but only if the evidence was unreliable due to factors relating to the
eyewitness and independent of the police. A genuine focus on reliability would
47 See Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 112 (1977).
48 ld.
49 Id. at 112-13.
50 Id. at 110-14. Some federal district courts believed Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967)
had created a per se rule for unnecessarily suggestive identifications. See supra notes 27-28 and
accompanying text.
5' Brathwaite, 432 U.S. at 112.
52 Id. at 112-13.
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take into account the degree to which an identification has been so tainted by a
suggestive procedure as to have been drained of its probative value. And, of
course, this would be only one factor assessed in determining the overall reliability
of the identification evidence. By excluding suggestiveness from the reliability
analysis, the test skews the analysis in favor of admissibility, and makes
suggestiveness a threshold requirement that is ultimately beside the point in the
critical reliability assessment.
B. A Distorted View of Reliability
The Supreme Court instructs courts to consider the "totality of the
circumstances" in determining reliability, but this "totality" turns out to be
restricted to a checklist of five factors (which, again, do not include
suggestiveness).53 Some of the estimator variables that scientists have shown to
affect identification accuracy do come into play at this point, but the list of factors
is problematic. 4 First, it includes the consideration of the witness's level of
certainty as an indication of reliability, when scientific studies show witness
certainty does not correlate with reliability.55 Second, it fails to include many other
important estimator variables such as cross-race identification and weapon-focus,
which have a strong impact on reliability.5 6 By limiting the courts to a restrictive
list of factors, the Supreme Court's test has actually hamstrung the lower courts in
their ability to evaluate the true "totality" of the circumstances. The Supreme
Court's test, riddled with flaws and contradictions, has long overstayed its
welcome. The Due Process test should begin and end with a genuine evaluation of
reliability, and police suggestion should be one of many factors in that analysis.
Instead, under the federal Due Process test, courts will not hear cases that do not
involve suggestive practices, no matter how unreliable the evidence may otherwise
be. They do not hear cases that involve suggestive behavior by private parties,
only police suggestion satisfies the threshold requirement. And, even if police
suggestion is present, they do not evaluate reliability in a scientifically sound
manner.
5 7
53 See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text.
54 For thorough assessments of how the Supreme Court's five factors measure up to scientific
studies, see Gary L. Wells & Deah S. Quinlivan, Suggestive Eyewitness Identification Procedures
and the Supreme Court's Reliability Test in Light of Eyewitness Science: 30 Years Later, 33 LAW &
HuM. BEHAV. 1 (2009); Gary L. Wells & Donna M. Murray, What Can Psychology Say About the
Neil v. Biggers Criteria for Judging Eyewitness Accuracy?, 68 J. APPLIED PSYcHOL. 347 (1983).
55 See supra note 43.
56 See supra note 14 and infra note 86.
57 See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text.
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C. Twisted Logic on the Necessity of Suggestive Practices
The Supreme Court embraced necessity as a justification for a highly
suggestive identification procedure,58 but then refused to employ a rule of per se
exclusion for suggestive practices that were unnecessary. 59 Unfortunately, the
Court got it wrong on both accounts. First, necessity should not justify the
admission of identification evidence obtained by means of a highly suggestive
procedure. Instead, the lack of necessity should be considered simply as an
aggravating factor in reviewing the propriety of police conduct. As the Supreme
Court itself said in Biggers, "[s]uggestive confrontations are disapproved because
they increase the likelihood of misidentification, and unnecessarily suggestive ones
are condemned for the further reason that the increased chance of misidentification
is gratuitous."
60
The Court's first foray into the Due Process protections during identifications,
Stovall v. Denno, upheld identification evidence obtained by means of a highly
suggestive single-person show-up. 61 The Court upheld the show-up on purely
pragmatic terms: "Here was the only person in the world who could possibly
exonerate Stovall .... [T]he police followed the only feasible procedure .... 62
Unfortunately, the necessity justification is simply wrong for multiple
reasons. First, it overlooks the fact that an impermissibly suggestive show-up will
have a tendency to cause a victim to inculpate a possibly innocent person, not
exculpate him, precisely because it is suggestive. Second, it assumes that unless a
witness can expeditiously exonerate a suspect, the suspect might be wrongly
convicted. The Court overlooks the fact that without the witness's identification of
the suspect, he might not have been convicted at all! 63 Implicitly, the Court's
statement suggests that there was sufficient other evidence to convict the suspect,
and only the witness could thus exonerate him, but this was hardly the case.
If instead what the Court meant was that an innocent person might be wrongly
arrested, then the decision to allow the suggestive procedure is wrong for two
different reasons. First, we should prefer keeping the innocent person in custody
for a longer period until he can exonerate himself (by means of alibi or other
means) over the use of a suggestive identification procedure which is likely to
result in an erroneous conviction that results in the person being unjustly
incarcerated for years. Second, if the police have only enough other evidence to
58 Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 301-02 (1967).
59 Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 110-14 (1977); see also Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188,
198-99 (1972).
60 Biggers, 409 U.S. at 198.
61 Stovall, 388 U.S. at 301-02.
62 Id. at 302 (quoting Stovall v. Denno, 355 F.2d 731, 735 (2d Cir. 1966) (en banc)).
63 The Court does mention other evidence linking the defendant to the scene of the crime-his
keys found in a shirt-but it would hardly have sufficed to obtain a conviction of the defendant. Id.
at 295.
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support a reasonable suspicion or probable cause, then what the Court is really
saying is that the witness is the only person in the world who can possibly convict
Stovall. The truth is that without the suggestive identification procedure, the State
might not have had sufficient evidence to convict him. In so many violent crime
cases, an eyewitness's statement of identification is the crucial identifying
evidence against the defendant, and sometimes it is the only evidence linking the
defendant to the crime. 64
Putting aside the faulty premises in the Court's reasoning, there is still the
fundamentally flawed assumption that society is equally justified in using a
defective procedure to exonerate an innocent person as it is to convict an
ostensibly guilty person. The Court assumes without explaining that a procedure
that may benefit the innocent can fairly be used against an accused. Does it
comport with Due Process to use a witness's statement-knowingly obtained by
the State under circumstances that render the statement highly unreliable-as a
means of convicting a defendant? Evidence must be reliable if it is the basis for
depriving someone of his or her life or liberty, but it need not be as reliable if the
only question is whether to arrest a person or not.65 If the witness says, "that's not
the guy who stabbed me," then there is no cause for holding the defendant, but the
converse is not necessarily true. It does not follow that her statement identifying a
suspect as the culprit-"that's the guy"-can fairly be used to obtain a conviction.
Just because this was the only way to get identification evidence, it does not follow
that the exigencies somehow transform the identification testimony into good
evidence, or that it comports with fundamental fairness to allow the State to use the
evidence. Of course, it may mean that there is no other way to obtain evidence to
support a conviction, but that was not the expediency the Court held up as the
rationale for condoning the unnecessarily suggestive identification procedure. Not
surprisingly, since Stovall was decided, the Court's logic of ostensibly using show-
ups as a means of exonerating the innocent has instead justified the use of show-
66ups that have convicted many an innocent person.
64 See Thompson, supra note 1, at 1497 (suggesting a corroborating evidence requirement for
eyewitness identification evidence).
65 For a review of federal case law on suggestiveness and necessity in eyewitness
identification evidence, see Ofer Raban, On Suggestive and Necessary Identification Procedures, 37
Am. J. Crim. L. 53 (2009).
66 Although the Supreme Court has long acknowledged that show-ups are "widely
condemned" in scientific and legal literature, they continue to be a commonly used form of
identification procedure. See Stovall, 388 U.S. at 302 (recognizing that the use of show-ups rather
than lineups "has been widely condemned"). They also produce more false identifications than line-
ups, and they taint later identifications by the same witness by falsely increasing the witness's
confidence level. See Thompson, supra note 1, at 1504-05. Numerous wrongful convictions
discovered in the recent past have been based on show-up identifications. See, e.g., Steve McGonigle
& Jennifer Emily, DNA Exoneree Fell Victim to "Drive-By" Identification, DALLAS
MORNING NEWS, Oct. 13, 2008,
http://www.dallasnews.com/sharedcontent/dws/dn/dnacases/stories/101308dnproDNAshowups.264c
41d.html (last visited Apr. 13, 2010).
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In Brathwaite, the Court subsequently removed necessity as a consideration
and made reliability the "linchpin. ' 67  Thus, even an unnecessarily suggestive
identification procedure can yield admissible identification evidence if it is
otherwise found to be reliable under the Biggers checklist. Again, the Court
missed the mark in not drawing a clear line against highly suggestive practices,
especially when they are not necessary.
D. Viewing Stovall, Biggers, and Brathwaite Through the Lens of Science
The reliability problems that attend many eyewitness identifications have to
do with the quick and violent nature of the crimes. In re-reading the decades-old
Due Process cases today, one is struck by the presence of numerous estimator
variables that researchers have shown decrease the accuracy of an identification.
Applying the knowledge obtained through scientific research to the Supreme
Court's principal decisions-Stovall v. Denno, Neil v. Biggers, and Manson v.
Brathwaite-we can now identify many such estimator variables, variables
inherent in the witness and that the police cannot correct or control.68
For example, the facts in Biggers showed that the female victim first viewed
the culprit in an unlit kitchen with light from a bedroom that was shining through.69
She could see that he was young and carried a butcher knife.70 The assailant led
her at knifepoint for a distance of two blocks into some woods where he raped her
and then fled. The assault occurred at night illuminated only by a full moon, and
took between fifteen minutes and half an hour.71 These were hardly optimal
conditions for observing a stranger's face.72 Scientific studies, although not
conclusive, show that the extreme stress and fear provoked by a violent crime
involving this level of danger may reduce the victim's perceptual skills, making an
accurate identification less likely. 73  In addition, the presence of a weapon
generally causes victims to focus on the weapon' rather than on the face of the
assailant.74 The amount of time for viewing the culprit was presumably confined
67 Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 114 (1977).
68 See supra notes 54-56 and accompanying text.
69 Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 193-94 (1972).
70 Id. at 193.
71 Id. at 194.
72 See supra note 14.
73 See CUTLER & PENROD, supra note 43, at 102--04 (detailing findings that show crime
seriousness does not affect accuracy of identifications and that ethical considerations impede the
ability to study the stress of violent crimes). Some studies indicate that increased arousal
(experienced during the commission of a mock crime) leads to better identifications of persons
central to the event, but other researchers have found that when stress levels become too high, such as
that felt by a victim facing extreme danger, perceptual skills become debilitated. Id. at 103-04.
74 See id. at 101-02; LOFTUS, DOYLE & DYSART, supra note 14, at 16-36 (addressing effects
of weapon focus, among others that affect eyewitness identification accuracy); Wells & Olson, supra
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to the short period during which the victim and assailant stood face to face in the
darkened room in the house and possibly during the time in which he led her to the
woods, although it is not clear that she could see his face at that time. It would
seem more likely that he would walk behind her while leading her at knifepoint
and that she might catch passing glances.
The Supreme Court disagreed with the district court's conclusion that the
identification was not reliable.75 Some of the disagreement centered on whether
there had been sufficient time and lighting to make an accurate identification.
Other conclusions reached by the Supreme Court are not consistent with scientific
research on identifications. For example, the Court was swayed by the fact that the
witness was not a "casual observer, but rather the victim of one of the most
personally humiliating of all crimes. 76 Scientific studies, while not refuting this
assumption, are inconclusive with regard to the effects on accuracy of a victim's
stress of experiencing a violent crime as compared to a casual observer." The
Court also puts stock in the fact that the victim was "a practical nurse by
profession," perhaps suggesting that this fact somehow made her better able to
make an accurate identification.78 Studies conclude that even individuals in certain
professions, such as bank tellers, who are given instruction on facial recognition,
are not better able to make accurate identifications. 79 The Court also put its faith in
the victim's statements that she had "no doubt" that the defendant was her rapist
and that there was something about his face that she did not think she could ever
forget.80 Again, scientific studies show that such expressions of confidence in
identifications bear no relation to accuracy, and that a witness's expressed level of
confidence will typically increase from the time the identification is made to the
time of trial.81
In Stovall v. Denno, the witness walked into her kitchen at midnight to
discover a male intruder who had just fatally stabbed her husband. 2 She then
jumped on the intruder, who proceeded to stab her eleven times.8 3 She later
identified the defendant in a single-suspect show-up, with the defendant
handcuffed to a police officer, from her hospital bed the day after life-saving
surgery.8 4 Like Biggers, this case is rife with estimator variables that reduce the
note 14, at 280-82 (eyewitness accuracy can be affected by many factors, including presence of a
weapon).
" Biggers, 409 U.S. at 200.
76 Id.
77 See supra note 73.
78 Biggers, 409 U.S. at 201.
79 See CUTLER & PENROD, supra note 43, at 85-88.
80 Biggers, 409 U.S. at 200-01.
81 See supra notes 43-45 and accompanying text.
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accuracy-extreme stress, use of a weapon, a serious assault, limited time for
viewing, and, in this case, a victim who was likely in great pain and sedated at the
time of the identification. In addition, the Court notes that during the show-up the
defendant was "the only Negro in the room," indicating a cross-racial
identification.85 Scientific findings show conclusively that persons of all races are
less accurate in identifying persons of a different race, regardless of their
experience with persons of a different race or their feelings toward persons of
another race.86  In both Biggers and in this case, the victims based the
identifications on a visual inspection of the suspects' appearances as well as by
listening to their voices. 87 Voice identification has proved highly unreliable when
a witness attempts to identify an unfamiliar voice based on minimal previous
interaction under stressful circumstances.
88
The Supreme Court's third significant Due Process case, Manson v.
Brathwaite, involved a brief encounter between an undercover police officer and a
drug seller.89 Unlike the other two cases, the eyewitness in this case was not a
victim, nor was the crime violent in nature.90 The crime was initiated by the police
officer acting undercover. 9' Thus, factors such as weapon-focus, the stress of fear,
and being the victim of a serious assault are not present. This case did involve,
however, the unnecessary display of a single photo to the police witness who
confirmed that the man in the photo was the drug seller.92  Although
counterintuitive, even people specially trained in eyewitness identification, such as
police officers, are not better able to make accurate identifications.93
In Stovall, there was apparently strong corroborating evidence. The Court
said only that a shirt was found on the kitchen floor with keys in a pocket which
were traced to petitioner. If these facts are true, we can breathe easier about
admitting the identification testimony in this case. Stovall does not mention this
corroborating evidence in ruling on the admissibility of the evidence. In
85 Id.
86 See LoFrus, supra note 40, at 136-37 ("It seems to be a fact-it has been observed so
many times-that people are better at recognizing faces of persons of their own race than a different
race."); see also Behrman & Davey, supra note 17, at 476 (confirming importance of cross-race
factor by means of archival analysis of real cases and determining effects of cross-race bias, among
other estimator variables, on "suspect identification rates," or rates at which eyewitnesses identified
persons that police had singled out as suspects).
87 Stovall, 388 U.S. at 295.
88 See Lawrence M. Solan & Peter M. Tiersma, Hearing Voices: Speaker Identification in
Court, 54 HASTINGs L.J. 373, 393-413 (2003) (reviewing scientific literature on voice identification).
89 432 U.S. 98, 99-101 (1977).
90 Id. at 101.
9' Id. at 99-100.
92 Id. at 101-02.
93 See CUTLER & PENROD, supra note 43, at 85-86 (studies of individuals who are trained in
facial recognition for purposes of eyewitness identification during crimes, such as bank tellers, are
not shown to be more accurate as eyewitnesses).
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Brathwaite, the Court noted that its reliability assessment is "hardly undermined"
by the fact that other evidence linked the defendant to the location of the crime;
however, the Court did not go so far as to require corroborating evidence. Indeed,
the Court stated that this evidence "plays no part in [the Court's] analysis." A
corroborating evidence requirement would go a long way to ensure the accuracy of
a conviction.94 Unfortunately, neither Due Process nor any other law requires it,
and identification testimony alone suffices to obtain convictions.95 In Biggers, on
the other hand, the defendant was convicted on the sole basis of the eyewitness's
identification.
E. Misguided Reliance on Other Safeguards in the Trial Process
In 1908, Hugo Miinsterberg, a prominent psychologist and researcher of
eyewitness identification, wrote:
The time for such Applied Psychology is surely near . . . . The
lawyer alone is obdurate.
The lawyer and the judge and the juryman are sure that they do not
need the experimental psychologist .... They go on thinking that their
legal instinct and their common sense supplies them with all that is
needed and somewhat more.
96
Amazingly enough, attitudes among the legal profession do not seem to have
changed much in over a hundred years.97 Instead of adopting a rule that actually
results in the exclusion of unreliable eyewitness identification testimony, the
Supreme Court has put its trust in juries to sort out reliability issues on its own.
The Court in Brathwaite justified its less restrictive approach as follows:
We are content to rely upon the good sense and judgment of American
juries, for evidence with some element of untrustworthiness is customary
grist for the jury mill. Juries are not so susceptible that they cannot
measure intelligently the weight of identification testimony that has some
questionable feature.98
94 For a discussion of the role that corroborating evidence should play in a Due Process
analysis, see Rudolf Koch, Note, Process v. Outcome: The Proper Role of Corroborative Evidence in
Due Process Analysis of Eyewitness Identification Testimony, 88 CORNELL L. REv. 1097 (2003)
(arguing that corroborative evidence of general guilty should only be considered in post-conviction
harmless error analysis).
95 See generally Thompson, supra note 1 (proposing corroborating evidence requirement for
admission of eyewitness identification evidence).
96 Loh, supra note 12, at 662 (quoting HuGo MUNSTERBERG, ON THE WITNESS STAND 9-11
(1908)).
97 See supra note 12.
98 See Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 116 (1977).
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The scientific literature shows clearly that jurors (not to mention judges and
lawyers) are not generally equipped to distinguish between reliable and unreliable
identification evidence. 99 Thus, the Supreme Court's trust in juries to reject
unreliable identification evidence on its own is simply misplaced.
Juror decision making can be improved by means of jury instructions or
expert testimony educating them on the types of factors that affect identification
accuracy.'0 Trial courts have wide latitude in deciding whether to give requested
jury instructions or whether to permit expert testimony.10' Experience shows that,
more often than not, courts deny requests for jury instructions and for admission of
expert testimony on eyewitness identifications. 10 2 Appellate courts uphold these
discretionary decisions, often on the ground that the defense adequately raised
reliability issues on cross-examination of the eyewitness and in summation.'
0 3
However, lawyers cannot educate jurors about the factors that affect eyewitness
identification accuracy as part of their cross-examination, nor may they address
matters not in evidence as part of their arguments to the jury. Not surprisingly,
scientific studies confirm the inadequacy of cross-examination as a means of juror
education, 1°4 leading legal scholars to urge courts to admit expert testimony
instead. 105
In summary, the federal Due Process test, less restrictive by design, invariably
leads to the admission of eyewitness identification testimony by relying on the
"good sense and judgment" of jurors to give appropriate weight to the testimony,
even though scientific studies now show that jurors are not capable of doing so.
99 See, e.g., CUTLER & PENROD, supra note 43, at 207-09 (relying on survey studies,
prediction studies, and mock juror studies to conclude that "jurors are generally insensitive to factors
that influence eyewitness identification accuracy" and are generally unable to detect unreliable
identification testimony).
100 See LOFTUS, supra note 40, at 191.
101 See Thompson, supra note 1, at 1516-17.
102 See id.
103 See id at 1516 (citing study that found cross-examination to be ineffective in conveying
information about problems inherent in eyewitness identifications); LOFTUS, DOYLE & DYSART, supra
note 14, at 353 ("Although much of the specific information in an eyewitness case-the lighting, the
initial descriptions, the duration of the encounter-is available through aggressive cross-examination,
the general propositions that must be supplied if the jurors are to use that specific information with
appropriate caution usually have to be conveyed in some other way.").
104 See LoFrus, DOYLE & DYSART, supra note 14, at 353.
105 See generally Wise, Dauphinais & Safer, supra note 21, at 823-43 (proposing that expert
witness be allowed to testify when eyewitness identification testimony is the primary or sole evidence
against a defendant, and addressing the shortcomings of other possible remedies such as jury
instructions and cross-examination); Henry F. Fradella, Why Judges Should Admit Expert Testimony
on the Unreliability of Eyewitness Testimony, FED. CTS. L. REv., June 2006, at 28 (taking view that
jury instructions are inadequate to educate juries on eyewitness identification issues and urging
admission of expert testimony); Fredric D. Woocher, Note, Did Your Eyes Deceive You? Expert
Psychological Testimony on the Unreliability of Eyewitness Identification, 29 STAN. L. REV. 969
(1977) (arguing that expert psychological testimony is necessary for a competent defense).
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While expert witnesses would go a long way in equipping juries with the ability to
properly evaluate identification testimony, the testimony is generally not admitted,
nor do courts often give clear jury instructions either. Instead, jurors routinely hear
questionable eyewitness identification testimony and are left to fend for themselves
in evaluating the reliability of the evidence. The result should not surprise us-
scores of wrongful convictions.
II. STATE SUPREME COURTS ENGAGE IN INCREMENTAL JURISPRUDENTIAL
CORRECTION
"Appellate courts have a responsibility to look forward, and a legal concept's
longevity should not be extended when it is established that it is
no longer appropriate."
Brodes v. State, 614 S.E.2d 766, 771 (Ga. 2005).
Because federal Due Process law has provided virtually no protection against
the use of eyewitness identification evidence, federal courts admit identification
evidence even when it is obtained through highly suggestive means or is otherwise
highly unreliable. Most state courts have applied the federal standard in
interpreting their state constitutions as well.'0 6 Some state courts, however, have
taken the initiative to ensure the reliability of identification evidence-and
ultimately the fairness of trials-as have some state legislatures and law
enforcement agencies.
To date a small percentage of the reforms addressing these problems have
come directly from law enforcement agencies.' 07 Reforms have been implemented
on a statewide basis through legislation in only a handful of states, with North
Carolina serving as the prime example. 0 8 In the state appellate courts, only a few
106 See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 650 N.E.2d 1257, 1265-66 & n.2 (Mass. 1995) (Nolan, J.,
dissenting) (noting that virtually every other state has adopted the federal reliability test under their
State constitutions and citing cases); see also Thompson, Judicial Blindness, supra note 7 (providing
findings of year-long empirical study of state eyewitness identification Due Process cases and
demonstrating that many states follow outdated federal constitutional standards and none in the study
required reforms to eyewitness identification practices).
107 The Innocence Project of the Cardozo School of Law lists three examples of local law
enforcement agencies that have changed their identification policies in response to the growing
awareness of misidentification problems in wrongful convictions. See supra note 5.
'o' See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-284.50-.53 (2009); see also Christine C. Mumma, The North
Carolina Actual Innocence Commission: Uncommon Perspectives Joined by a Common Cause, 52
DRAKE L. REv. 647 (2004) (addressing mission and accomplishments of North Carolina Actual
Innocence Commission in implementing reforms and reviewing claims of actual innocence). The
North Carolina law implementing new police procedures for identifications had its genesis in the
recommendations of the commission. See N.C. ACTUAL INNOCENCE COMM'N, RECOMMENDATIONS
FOR EYEwITNEss IDENTIFICATION,
http://www.ncids.org/New/o2OLegal%2OResources/Eyewitness%201D.pdf, see also Jerome M.
Maiatico, Note, All Eyes On Us: A Comparative Critique of the North Carolina Innocence Inquiry
Commission, 56 DUKE L.J. 1345 (2007) (critiquing North Carolina's unique tribunal for addressing
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state supreme courts have taken the initiative to depart from the federal Due
Process model. These decisions, however, provide a useful roadmap for other state
appellate courts that may be inclined to provide a more rigorous review of
identification testimony as a safeguard against wrongful convictions.
It is important to note from the outset that state supreme courts actually have
several legal avenues besides enforcing their state constitutions for developing
rules that are consistent with scientific research and that require law enforcement
to avoid suggestiveness in obtaining identification evidence. Over the years, state
high courts have invoked these different legal bases in eyewitness identification
cases, grounding their decisions on the supervisory authority of state high courts to
ensure the fair administration of justice, 10 9 on common law principles of
fairness,110 on evidentiary grounds,"' as well as on state constitutional grounds."
12
In a rare case, the Supreme Court of New Jersey exercised its supervisory role over
the court system to require a detailed written record, preferably an electronic
recordation, of the pretrial identification procedure." 3 Most of the cases, however,
simply use the Brathwaite test as the baseline when interpreting State
constitutional law.
claims of actual innocence). Other states have also adopted or considered reforms to eyewitness
identification procedures. See Scott Ehlers, Eyewitness Identification: State Law Reform, 29
CHAMPION 34 (2005) (outlining state legislative reforms).
109 See, e.g., State v. Delgado, 902 A.2d 888, 896-97 (N.J. 2006). Others have explored the
role of the inherent supervisory authority of state supreme courts. See, e.g., Bennett L. Gershman,
Supervisory Power of the New York Courts, 14 PACE L. REV. 41, 44-45 (1994) (recounting history
and applications of New York supervisory power and addressing issues of legitimacy); Jake
Sussman, Suspect Choices: Lineup Procedures and the Abdication of Judicial and Prosecutorial
Responsibility for Improving the Criminal Justice System, 27 N.Y.U. REv. L. & SOC. CHANGE 507,
508 (2002) (arguing that New York trial court should have invoked supervisory power to require
sequential lineup). Scholars have also addressed the supervisory power of the federal courts. See,
e.g., Sara Sun Beale, Reconsidering Supervisory Power in Criminal Cases: Constitutional and
Statutory Limits on the Authority of the Federal Courts, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1433, 1434-35 (1984)
(concluding that concept of supervisory power should be abandoned in favor of identifying specific
constitutional and statutory powers to employ); Matthew E. Brady, Note, A Separation of Powers
Approach to the Supervisory Power of the Federal Courts, 34 STAN. L. REV. 427, 428 (1982)
(proposing least restrictive means approach to exercise of supervisory power to maintain principles of
separation of power); Nathan E. Ross, Comment The Nearly Forgotten Supervisory Power: The
Wrench to Retaining the Miranda Warnings, 66 Mo. L. REV. 849, 850 (2001) (addresses Supreme
Court's choice to constitutionalize Miranda warnings instead of invoking its supervisory power).
Io See Commonwealth v. Jones, 666 N.E.2d 994, 1001 (Mass. 1996) (basing suppression of
identification procedure on common law grounds).
"'1 See State v. Chen, 952 A.2d 1094, 1103 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2008) ("The foundation
of our evidence rules, at least insofar as jury trials are concerned, is to provide the fact-finder with
only reliable and probative evidence."); id. at 1105 (citing State v. Hibl, 714 N.W.2d 194, 201-02,
205-06 (Wis. 2006)); People v. Owens, 97 P.3d 227, 233-34 (Colo. App. 2004); State v. Holliman,
570 A.2d 680, 684 (Conn. 1990); People v. Blackman, 110 A.D.2d 596, 488 N.Y.S.2d 395, 397
(1985) (also applying fairness requirement under the 5 'h Amendment).
12 See, e.g., State v. Dubose, 699 N.W.2d 582, 595 (Wis. 2005).
"' See Delgado, 902 A.2d at 896-97.
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A. Tweaking Brathwaite: Incorporating Scientific Findings and Promoting Best
Practices by the Police
The creative work done by state appellate courts has mostly involved taking
the Supreme Court's two-step suggestiveness/reliability test as developed in
Stovall, Brathwaite, and Biggers, and tweaking it. No state court has departed
completely from the federal model and created an entirely new rule from whole
cloth, but the changes are extremely important nonetheless.
After Stovall, some courts believed that the federal high court had adopted a
per se rule of exclusion for identifications obtained through unnecessarily
suggestive means," 4 but Brathwaite rejected a per se exclusionary rule in favor of
a test that ostensibly hinged on reliability instead." 5 The most dramatic departures
from the federal rule were adopted in Massachusetts, New York, and Wisconsin.
The Supreme Courts in these states have adopted, as a matter of state constitutional
law, a per se exclusionary rule for unnecessarily suggestive identifications. 116 The
Wisconsin Supreme Court, the most recent to adopt a per se exclusionary rule,
although limited to show-ups, began its assessment by recognizing that "[o]ver the
last decade, there have been extensive studies on the issue of identification
evidence, research that is now impossible for us to ignore."" 7 The Wisconsin
Court, influenced by the prominent role of erroneous identifications in wrongful
convictions, abandoned the federal reliability test "since it is extremely difficult, if
not impossible, for courts to distinguish between identifications that were reliable




The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts also took issue with
Brathwaite, refuting it point-by-point. It expressed concerns about the dangers of
mistaken identifications to the truth-finding goal of criminal trials because jurors
tend to be "unduly receptive to eyewitness evidence."' '19 The Massachusetts court
then rejected the Supreme Court's reasoning that the totality test would sufficiently
deter the police from using unnecessarily suggestive procedures. The state court
wrote, "To the contrary, it appears clear to us that the reliability test does little or
nothing to discourage police from using suggestive identification procedures ....
'[U]nder Brathwaite, the showup has flourished . . . . Almost any suggestive
lineup will still meet reliability standards."",120  Finally, the court disputed the
statement in Brathwaite that a per se rule would negatively affect the
administration of justice by denying the trier reliable evidence and causing, on
114 See supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text.
115 See supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text.
116 See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 650 N.E.2d 1257, 1261 (Mass. 1995); People v. Adams,
423 N.E.2d 379, 384 (N.Y. 1981); State v. Dubose, 699 N.W.2d 582, 593-94 (Wis. 2005).
"' Dubose, 699 N.W.2d at 591.
118 Id. at 592.
"9 Johnson, 650 N.E.2d at 1261.
120 Id. at 1263 (citation omitted).
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occasion, "the guilty going free." 121 Instead, the court took the view that "[t]he
inverse of this is probably more accurate: the admission of unnecessarily
suggestive identification procedures under the reliability test would likely result in
the innocent being jailed while the guilty remain free." 122 The Massachusetts court
added, "The Brathwaite Court disregards the wisdom of Justice Harlan when he
wrote: 'it is far worse to convict an innocent man than to let a guilty man go
free. ,,,123
The New York Court of Appeals has distinguished a per se exclusionary rule
for suggestive identifications from that applicable to other violations of
constitutional rights, such as the fruits of illegal searches and seizures. The court
explained:
In [cases excluding the fruits of illegal searches and seizures,] generally
reliable evidence of guilt is suppressed because it was obtained illegally.
Although this serves to deter future violations, it is collateral and
essentially at variance with the truth-finding process. But the rule
excluding improper pretrial identifications bears directly on guilt or
innocence. It is designed to reduce the risk that the wrong person will be
convicted as a result of suggestive identification procedures employed by
the police.1
24
Thus, the exclusionary rule for suggestive identifications is justified both on
procedural grounds-as a means of deterring the police from improper practices-
and on substantive grounds, as a means of preventing consideration of unreliable
evidence.
Over time, a per se exclusionary rule for unnecessarily suggestive
identification practices tends to create, through a case-by-case method, a set of best
practices, although it does so in reverse fashion. By indicating disapproval of
certain practices, the courts implicitly require police to do the opposite, thus
effectively creating a set of rules for obtaining identification evidence in a non-
suggestive manner. The New York high court, for example, found it to be
unnecessarily suggestive for the police to conduct identification procedures with
several witnesses at once, and with two co-suspects at the same time. In so doing,
the court has made clear that it expects the police to keep witnesses separate while
conducting identification procedures, and that multiple suspects should not be
121 Id. (quoting Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 112 (1977)).
122 Id.
123 Id. (citing In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 372 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring)) (internal
citation omitted).
124 People v. Adams, 423 N.E.2d 379, 383 (N.Y. 1981) (citation omitted). The Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court expressed the same rationale, citing Adams among other cases, in adopting a
per se exclusionary rule. See Johnson, 650 N.E.2d at 1264.
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shown simultaneously to a witness. 125 The Massachusetts court made clear that
show-ups, which are inherently suggestive, should never be used unless done in
the immediate aftermath of a crime or in exigent circumstances. 126 In an earlier
case, the court had also declared multiple showings of the same suspect to be
unnecessarily suggestive.127 The practices sanctioned in these cases have been
recommended by organizations such as the Department of Justice, the American
Bar Association, and others, and often the reforming courts refer to the scientific
studies and these influential reports.
28
We see additional examples of rule setting in other state appellate courts. In
Connecticut, although the supreme court refused to depart from the Brathwaite
standard as a state constitutional matter, it nonetheless ruled that the failure to give
a witness an admonition that the guilty person may not be present in the photo
array should be taken into account as a factor in a totality of the circumstances
analysis. 129 The court also ruled that affirmatively telling the witness that the
suspect is in the photo array does render the identification procedure unnecessarily
suggestive.
130
The Utah Supreme Court, while not abandoning the Biggers reliability test,
has tweaked it to make it consistent with scientific principles.' 31 The Utah test
retains the first two Biggers factors: the opportunity of the witness to view the
actor during the event and the witness's degree of attention to the actor at the time
of the event.' 32 It then discards the last three Biggers factors: the accuracy of the
witness's prior description of the criminal, the level of certainty demonstrated by
the witness at the confrontation, and the length of time between the crime and the
confrontation.' 33 In their stead the court has adopted three new considerations: (1)
"the witness's capacity to observe the event, including his or her physical and
mental acuity;" (2) "whether the witness's identification was made spontaneously
and remained consistent thereafter, or whether it was the product of suggestion;"
and (3) "the nature of the event being observed and the likelihood that the witness
125 Adams, 423 N.E.2d at 382.
126 Johnson, 650 N.E.2d at 1261.
127 Commonwealth v. Botelho, 343 N.E.2d 876, 882 (Mass. 1976). The Massachusetts court
followed the Supreme Court's lead in Foster v. California, a case also involving multiple showings of
a suspect, which is the only Supreme Court case in which an identification procedure was found to
violate Due Process. 394 U.S. 440 (1969).
128 See Thompson, What Price Justice?, supra note 7, at 42-54 (reviewing leading reform
recommendations).
129 State v. Ledbetter, 881 A.2d 290, 313, 316 (Conn. 2005).
130 Id. at 316.
131 State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 780-81 (Utah 1991).
132 Compare Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 199 (1972), with Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 780-81.
133 Biggers, 409 U.S. at 199-200.
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would perceive, remember and relate it correctly.' 34 As for this last factor, the
court explains that it would encompass "whether the event was an ordinary one in
the mind of the observer during the time it was observed, and whether the race of
the actor was the same as the observer's."'135  The Utah rule eliminates the
scientifically unsound "witness confidence" factor of Biggers and incorporates two
critical elements: the extent to which police suggestion has affected the witness's
recollection and the effect of cross-race identifications. 36
The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine did not tinker with the legal test, but
applied different burdens of proof. If the defendant proves by a preponderance of
the evidence that the identification was obtained by "unnecessarily suggestive"
means, then the burden shifts to the government to prove by clear and convincing
evidence that the corrupting effect of the suggestive procedure is outweighed by
the reliability of the identification as measured by the factors outlined in
Biggers.137 The court put this burden on the government in recognition of the fact
that suggestive procedures create a risk of misidentification and that they are
contrary to "governmental fair play.' 38 The New Hampshire Supreme Court had
adopted the same rule the year before.' 
39
Some of the changes reflect a concern to broaden the scope of the
suggestiveness inquiry. For example, whereas Due Process claims only apply to
cases that involve impermissibly suggestive conduct by law enforcement, some
state courts have expanded the inquiry beyond the conduct of law enforcement to
account for suggestive actions by private parties. In order to reach private conduct,
the courts have looked beyond constitutional strictures and relied on evidentiary
grounds 140 or common law principles of fairness. 141
134 Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 781. The court had previously required that trial courts use these
same five factors to instruct juries on assessing the reliability of eyewitness identification. See State
v. Long, 721 P.2d 483, 493 (Utah 1986).
"' Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 781.
136 Id.
137 State v. Cefalo, 396 A.2d 233, 238-39 (Maine 1979). This interpretation of Brathwaite is
actually consistent with what the Supreme Court decided, but lower courts have generally not
considered suggestiveness beyond the threshold inquiry, and the decision has ultimately turned only
on reliability as assessed without reference to suggestiveness. See supra notes 33-34 and
accompanying text.
138 Id. at 237.
139 State v. Leclair, 385 A.2d 831, 834 (N.H. 1978).
140 State v. Chen, 952 A.2d 1094, 1101-02 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2008).
141 Commonwealth v. Jones, 666 N.E.2d 994, 1001 (Mass. 1996).
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B. In-Court Identifications and Independent Source Analysis
When the Brathwaite Due Process approach is applied, pretrial identification
evidence is rarely excluded. 142 Thus, there is no occasion to determine whether the
witness's in-court identification will be admissible, as it goes without saying that it
will be. 43 However, as states modify their Due Process standards in such a way
that more pretrial identifications may be excluded, the standard for admissibility of
in-court identifications becomes all the more important. Based on scientific
studies about memory distortion, a strong argument can be made that an earlier
suggestive identification procedure will permanently distort any later identification
by the same witness, including an in-court identification. 44 Thus, a suggestive
pretrial identification procedure renders any in-court identification just as
unreliable as the pretrial identification. As the Supreme Court has acknowledged
in relation to suggestive photo identification: "Regardless of how the initial
misidentification comes about, the witness thereafter is apt to retain in his memory
the image of the photograph rather than of the person actually seen .... ,145 There
is also the argument that an in-court identification is nothing more than a single
person show-up, 14 6 which the Supreme Court has recognized to be inherently
suggestive.
147
Some state supreme courts that have taken a more restrictive approach to
suggestive pretrial identifications seem eager to reassure their potential critics that
in-court identification evidence will still be available. For example, the New York
high court spoke directly to the fears that prosecutors might have about a
restrictive rule for pretrial identifications. The court wrote, "Excluding evidence
of a suggestive show-up does not deprive the prosecutor of reliable evidence of
guilt. The witness would still be permitted to identify the defendant in court if that
identification is based on an independent source.,', 48 The Massachusetts high court
has also taken this approach for all subsequent identifications, presumably
including subsequent pretrial identifications as well as in-court identifications. 49
142 See, e.g., O'Toole & Shay, supra note 21, at 126-32 (reviewing federal and state cases
applying Brathwaite test to admit identification evidence produced by highly suggestive means).
143 A full discussion of Due Process and in-court identifications is beyond the scope of this
article. For a discussion of the subject, see Evan J. Mandery, Legal Development: Due Process
Considerations of In-Court Identifications, 60 ALB. L. REV. 389, 420-422 (1996) (arguing for a per
se exclusionary rule for suggestive in-court identifications).
144 See Behrman & Davey, supra note 17, at 488 (addressing variety of ways in which earlier
identifications affect later ones).
145 Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 383-84 (1968).
146 See Mandery, supra note 143, at 390.
147 Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 302 (1967).
148 People v. Adams, 423 N.E.2d 379, 384 (N.Y. 1981).
149 Commonwealth v. Johnson, 650 N.E.2d 1257, 1262 (Mass. 1995) ("[C]ontrary to the
Brathwaite Court's unsubstantiated claim, the per se approach does not keep relevant and reliable
2010]
OHIO STATE JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW
If excluding suggestive or otherwise unreliable pretrial identifications is to
serve, at least in part, a deterrent goal, then admitting in-court identifications (or
other subsequent pretrial identifications) that follow a suppressed pretrial
identification is counter-productive. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
criticizes the ineffectiveness of the Brathwaite reliability test for deterring the
police, 50 but then proceeds confidently on the assumption that the per se rule will
be superior in deterring police misconduct.' 5' However, the Court fails to
recognize that admission of subsequent identifications will not prevent the police
from obtaining convictions in cases in which they use suggestive procedures.
Thus, it is hard to understand how this per se rule will lead to greater deterrence
than the Brathwaite rule.
In effect, the independent source rule puts the burden on the government to
establish the probable accuracy of the eyewitness's ability to identify the culprit in
court despite the earlier use of suggestiveness in the pretrial identification
procedure. 152 Usually this is based on the quality of the eyewitness's observations
during the crime. 53  In practice, this test is the functional equivalent of the
Brathwaite reliability test.' 54 In the same manner in which the Utah Supreme
Court has refined the Biggers factors for purposes of the Due Process reliability
test, the Wisconsin Supreme Court has likewise improved its independent source
analysis by incorporating the findings of experimental psychologists on cross-
racial identifications and witness confidence. 55 However, simply tightening the
test for determining whether there is an independent basis may not suffice to
safeguard against the admission of unreliable in-court identifications.
C. State Court Decisions on Jury Instructions and Expert Witnesses
As a general rule, courts have denied requests for jury instructions or expert
witnesses to assist the jurors in evaluating the reliability of eyewitness
identification evidence. 156 In a few cases, however, some state supreme courts
have used these tools to make improvements in the trial procedures, and even
police procedures.
The Connecticut Supreme Court, for example, while not prepared to abandon
the federal Due Process test, did effectively mandate new police procedures by
implementing mandatory jury instructions as a remedy in the event that the police
identification evidence from the jury. Subsequent identifications shown to come from a source
independent of the suggestive identification remain admissible under the per se approach.").
150 Id. at 1262-63.
'"' Id. at 1263.
152 See LoFrus, DOYLE & DYSART, supra note 14, at 194.
153 Id.
'54 See id.
' Id. at 195 (citing State v. McMorris, 570 N.W.2d 384 (Wis. 1997)).
156 See Thompson, supra note 1, at 1514.
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fail to follow the procedures.1 57  Invoking its supervisory authority over the
administration of justice, the court effectively required that police advise
eyewitnesses that the perpetrator may or may not be present in the identification
procedure, and that the police refrain from telling the witness that the suspect is
present in an identification procedure. The court considered this issue of utmost
importance in maintaining the integrity of the justice system:
Appellate courts possess an inherent supervisory authority over the
administration of justice .... Supervisory powers are exercised to direct
trial courts to adopt judicial procedures that will address matters that are
of utmost seriousness, not only for the integrity of a particular trial but
also for the perceived fairness of the judicial system as a whole .... 158
Should the police fail to follow these guidelines, jurors must be instructed that the
failure to give such admonition or the telling of a witness of the suspect's presence
"[may increase] the likelihood that the witness will select one of the individuals in
the procedure, even when the perpetrator is not present [and thus may] increase the
probability of a misidentification."'
159
In the ordinary course of criminal trials, trial courts will sometimes agree to
give jury instructions on what factors to consider in assessing the reliability of
eyewitness identification. Often mirroring the Biggers factors, these instructions
will usually include witness certainty as a consideration.160 The Georgia Supreme
Court, upon reviewing the scientific literature refuting witness certainty as an
indicator of accuracy, directed lower courts to refrain from giving such an
instruction.' 61 It also found the instruction to constitute harmful error in a case in
which there was no other evidence to corroborate the identification.'
62
The New Jersey Supreme Court, also taking stock of the scientific literature
on cross-racial identification, required a jury instruction sensitizing jurors to the
possibility that the cross-racial nature of the identification affected its accuracy.
163
157 State v. Ledbetter, 881 A.2d 290, 316 (Conn. 2005). The use of such admonitions is
recommended by leading reform proposals. See Thompson, What Price Justice?, supra note 7, at 52
(noting that the reports from all the groups making reform proposals reviewed in the Article called
for cautionary instructions that the perpetrator may or may not be present, among other instructions)
(citation omitted).
"'8 Ledbetter, 881 A.2d at 317-18 (citation omitted).
169 Id. at319.
'(o See, e.g., Brodes v. State, 614 S.E.2d 766, 769 (Ga. 2005) (stating that the reliability
criteria in pattern jury instructions appear to have their roots in Biggers); see also Thompson, Judicial
Blindness, supra note 7, (manuscript at 30, available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cftn?abstractid=1515974) (noting that many state courts give jury
instruction on witness certainty).
161 Brodes, 614 S.E.2d at 771.
162 Id.
163 State v. Cromedy, 727 A.2d 457, 461-67 (N.J. 1999).
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It required this in a case in which identification played a key role and where there
was no corroborating evidence. 16 It was later learned that the defendant in the
New Jersey case had been misidentified by the victim and was innocent.'
65
With regard to the admission of expert testimony on specific psychological
factors affecting identification accuracy, state supreme courts generally regard the
issue as a purely discretionary decision for the trial court. 66 However, the Utah
Supreme Court has recently held that expert testimony on factors affecting the
accuracy of eyewitness identification should be admitted whenever it meets the
requirements of Rule 702 of the state's evidence rules, 167 as has the Supreme Court
of Tennessee.168  Both courts effectively mandated the liberal admission of
qualified expert testimony in cases in which an eyewitness is identifying a stranger
and when one or more established factors affecting accuracy are present.' 69 Most
state high courts continue to uphold the exclusion of expert testimony, and uphold
trial courts' reliance on cross-examination to highlight matters relating to
unreliability.17 0  Unfortunately, cross-examination is not an effective means of
making jurors aware of some of the counterintuitive facts relating to eyewitness
identification accuracy.1
7 1
In short, some state supreme courts have provided various safeguards against
wrongful conviction by means of their jurisprudence on jury instructions and
expert testimony. In particular, some courts have incorporated the findings of
scientific research to fashion jury instructions that better equip jurors to make
informed decisions on identification reliability, and two now restrict trial courts'
164 Id. at 467.
165 See Thompson, supra note 1, at 1512-13 (discussing facts and ultimate exoneration of
defendant in the Cromedy case).
166 See id. at 1514-15 (discussing fact that trial courts, exercising their discretionary authority,
rarely permit eyewitness identification experts to testify).
167 State v. Clopten, 223 P.3d 1103, 1112 (Utah 2009).
168 State v. Copeland, 226 S.W.3d 287, 301 (Tenn. 2007) (also applying similar rule 702 of the
Tennessee Rules of Evidence).
169 Clopten, 223 P.3d at 1113 n.22 (listing numerous such established factors). This rule is
intended to "result in the liberal and routine admission of eyewitness expert testimony," particularly
in cases involving identification of a stranger, and it is not limited to cases in which corroborating
identification evidence is absent. Id. at 1112. The Court found the failure to admit expert testimony
in Clopten's case to be an abuse of discretion. Id. at 1117. See also Copeland, 226 S.W.3d at 299
("It is the educational training of the experts and empirical science behind the reliability of
eyewitness testimony that persuades us to depart from the [more restrictive prior rule]. Times have
changed."). In contrast, a court of appeals in Idaho, following an earlier California Supreme Court
decision, requires admission of expert testimony on identification issues, but only when identification
is the key issue in the government's case and there is no corroborating evidence of identification. See
State v. Wright, 206 P.3d 856, 864 (Idaho Ct. App. 2009), following People v. McDonald, 690 P.2d
709, 727 (Cal. 1984).
170 See Wright, 206 P.3d at 864-65.
171 See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
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discretion to exclude expert witness testimony. But many more states do not do
either.
III. JUDICIAL RESTRAINT OR DERELICTION OF DUTY?
"It is therefore important to note that the state courts remain free, in
interpreting state constitutions, to guard against the evil clearly
identified by this case."
Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 128-29 (1977)
(Marshall, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
While taking baby steps in improving its identification jurisprudence, state
supreme courts betray their apprehension in treading upon the domain of law
enforcement in such a way as to imperil the pursuit of criminals. As the
Connecticut Supreme Court writes: "The courts are not blind to the inherent risks
of relying on eyewitness identification .... Nevertheless, we must recognize that
eyewitness identification remains a vital element in the investigation and
adjudication of criminal acts."'172  Even as it implemented a jury charge
requirement that effectively required law enforcement to refrain from suggestive
statements to witnesses and instead give prophylactic admonitions, the Connecticut
Court declined to actually mandate new protocols for the police, stating that it
"remain[ed] convinced, at this time, that such procedural matters should continue
to be the province of the law enforcement agencies of this state. '73  In 1977,
Justice Stevens, concurring in Brathwaite, expressed a similar sentiment, "I am
persuaded that this rulemaking function can be performed 'more effectively by the
legislative process than by a somewhat clumsy judicial fiat,' and that the Federal
Constitution does not foreclose experimentation by the States in the development
of such rules [to minimize the dangers of unreliable identification evidence]." 74
The problem with a deferential judiciary is that legislative change has been far
too slow in coming.175 Thirty-two years after Brathwaite, the vast majority of
172 State v. Ledbetter, 881 A.2d 290, 317 (Conn. 2005).
173 Id. at 315.
174 Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 118 (1977) (Stevens, J., concurring) (internal citations
omitted). In like fashion, the Supreme Court in United States v. Wade, the seminal case on the right
to counsel at lineups, indicated a preference for legislative reform or judicial remedies:
Legislative or other regulations, such as those of local police departments, which
eliminate the risks of abuse and unintentional suggestion at lineup proceedings and the
impediments to meaningful confrontation at trial may also remove the basis for regarding
the stage as "critical." But neither Congress nor the federal authorities have seen fit to
provide a solution. What we hold today "in no way creates a constitutional straitjacket
which will handicap sound efforts at reform, nor is it intended to have this effect."
388 U.S. 218, 239 (1967) (citation omitted).
175 See O'Toole & Shay, supra note 21 (arguing that courts should adopt affirmative minimum
guidelines for eyewitness identification procedures consistent with reform proposals and scientific
literature).
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states still employ substantially the same identification practices that they did when
Brathwaite was written. 176 And yet, so many state supreme courts continue to wait
for their state legislatures to act.
In the meantime, those same courts have had the obligations to oversee the
administration of justice,177 to ensure the reliability of evidence, and to uphold the
Due Process rights of the criminal defendants who appear before them. The
Wisconsin Supreme Court took the unusual approach of "recommend[ing]" that
police departments in the state implement "procedures similar to those proposed by
the Wisconsin Innocence Project to help make showup identifications as non-
suggestive as possible.' 178 In so doing, without specifying the exact procedures to
be followed, the court signaled to lower courts and the police that it would not
tolerate practices that did not conform more closely to state-of-the-art practices
proposed by reformers. When the New Jersey Supreme Court required written
documentation for lineups, and stated a preference for electronic recording, the
political context was favorable to such a decision. The Attorney General of the
state had already implemented significant reform procedures on a statewide basis,
and the Court noted this important development. 1
79
In contrast, most other state high courts have declined to take an active role in
developing a jurisprudence that requires the police to follow non-suggestive
practices and that excludes otherwise unreliable identification evidence. By
turning a blind eye to the scientific findings on eyewitness identification and the
problem of wrongful convictions, the majority of state appellate courts have
abdicated their constitutional and ethical responsibilities to see that justice is
done.' 80 Thus, the blame for the hundreds of wrongful convictions that have
occurred in the past few decades lies as much with these courts as with law
enforcement and legislatures. 181
176 See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 650 N.E.2d 1257, 1265-66 (Mass. 1995) (Nolan, J.,
dissenting).
177 See Commonwealth v. Jones, 666 N.E.2d 994, 999 (Mass. 1996) (addressing literature on
courts' supervisory power).
178 State v. Dubose, 699 N.W.2d 582, 594 (Wis. 2005). The Supreme Court in Wade similarly
provided a lengthy footnote with one commentator's proposed model statute for lineups. United
States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 236-37 n.26 (1967). The Wisconsin Court goes farther than simply
pointing out a model statute and actually indicates that anything less than compliance with reform
procedures is not likely to be viewed as constitutional.
179 State v. Delgado, 902 A.2d 888, 895 (N.J. 2006).
180 Courts have an affirmative duty to see that justice is done by assuring that trials are fair.
For a discussion of the ethical and professional duties of judges, see Mary Sue Backus, The
Adversary System is Dead; Long Live the Adversary System: The Trial Judge as the Great Equalizer
in Criminal Trials, 2008 MICH. ST. L. REv. 945 (arguing that trial judges have an ethical and
professional obligation to assure that criminal defendants receive effective legal representation).
181 The rules that govern appeals also have the tendency to create "tunnel vision" in the
appellate process that may contribute to the affirmance of wrongful convictions. See Keith A.
Findley & Michael S. Scott, The Multiple Dimensions of Tunnel Vision in Criminal Cases, 2006 Wis.
[Vol 7:603
EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATIONS AND STATE COURTS
Justice Stevens was right in proposing that states could engage in
experimentation to develop optimal rules to guide the police in gathering
identification evidence, 8 2 but he was wrong in suggesting that this was the sole
province of the legislature. State supreme courts have multiple sources of
authority upon which to rely as they engage in incremental jurisprudential
correction. To inform themselves about the science of eyewitness identification,
the courts can draw on the testimony of expert witnesses as transcribed in court
records, and they can take judicial notice of the massive body of research on
eyewitness identification.' 83  The Connecticut Supreme Court explained the
propriety of its surveying the relevant scientific data:
[A]n appellate court may take judicial notice of the existence of a body
of scientific literature. . . . To ensure consistency in the approach to
scientific evidence, a court should examine the foundation evidence
received, if any; the scientific literature; and other courts' analyses....
Indeed, even when, as in this case, there has been no evidence introduced
at the trial level, an appellate court may properly analy[ze] ... the issues
• . . based [only] on consideration of the information gleaned from prior
reported cases and published literature on the subject matter.'84
The Utah Supreme Court also cited a vast array of scientific literature in rendering
its decision to alter the Biggers factors for assessing the reliability of eyewitness
identification evidence.'
8 5
As the Connecticut court suggests, state appellate courts can also engage in a
dialogue with one another in their jurisprudential development, and, of course, they
do. When the Massachusetts court rejected Brathwaite's reliability test in favor of
a per se rule, it did so by citing the reasoning of courts in New York, Utah, and
New Hampshire, in addition to a large volume of scholarly literature.8 6 The
Georgia Supreme Court even cited several courts of appeal from other states on the
issue of witness certainty instructions.'
87
L. REv. 291, 348-54 (describing appellate rules that contribute to tunnel vision in wrongful
conviction cases).
182 See supra note 174 and accompanying text.
183 State v. Ledbetter, 881 A.2d 290, 312 (Conn. 2005); see also Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S.
412, 421 (1908) (taking judicial notice of numerous reports brought to its attention by counsel and
concluding that "[w]e take judicial cognizance of all matters of general knowledge").
"84 Ledbetter, 881 A.2d at 312 (citations omitted).
185 State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483, 489-91 (Utah 1986) (requiring cautionary instructions on
identification reliability factors when identification evidence is central issue).
186 Commonwealth v. Johnson, 650 N.E.2d 1257, 1260-64 (Mass. 1995).
187 Brodes v. State, 614 S.E.2d 766, 770-71 (Ga. 2005).
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IV. CONCLUSION
The question of whether to admit eyewitness identification testimony does not
present a philosophical quandary about principles of fairness or social policy. It is
a "yes" or "no" question that should turn on reliability, which is ultimately a fact-
intensive inquiry that should be heavily informed by scientific knowledge. Judges
can and do turn to science to gauge the probable accuracy of a witness's
identification. However, appellate courts are too often overly concerned about the
effects of excluding identifications on the ability of the government to obtain
convictions, as if convictions-regardless of their accuracy-in and of themselves
further society's law enforcement goals. They also express concerns about
whether it is legitimate for appellate courts to set procedural requirements for the
police. Unfortunately, the consequences of not acting to improve the procedures
for gathering identification evidence have been disastrous. The time has come for
state supreme courts to take affirmative action to effectuate change by
jurisprudential means.
The problems associated with eyewitness identifications are multifaceted, as
are the proposals for remedying them. As the Supreme Court long ago recognized
in United States v. Wade: "[W]here so many variables and pitfalls exist, the first
line of defense must be the prevention of unfairness and the lessening of the
hazards of eyewitness identification at the [pretrial identification] itself."'' 88 A
focus on suggestive practices is correct, as is consideration of other factors that
may indicate unreliability. Courts today do not begin from scratch--experts in law
enforcement and legal reform have already established recommendations for
procedural change that are considered state-of-the-art.189 Courts need only to take
cognizance of those reports and insist that police follow best practices.190
The stakes are indeed high. Mistaken identification continues to present a
serious danger of convicting innocent persons, especially in violent crime cases,
and meanwhile the guilty perpetrators remain at large unbeknownst to the
public.' 9' As the Innocence Project has shown, in most cases in which mistaken
identification played a part in a wrongful conviction, the real perpetrators have yet
to be found. 192 The need for reliable evidence of identification for purposes of
188 388 U.S. 218, 235 (1967).
189 See NAT'L INST. OF JUSTICE, supra note 16; Thompson, What Price Justice?, supra note 7,
at 46-55.
'90 See also O'Toole & Shay, supra note 21, at 116 (arguing for a revision of Brathwaite to
require affirmative minimum guidelines consistent with models such as those proposed by the
Department of Justice).
191 Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 127 (1977) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
192 See Innocence Project, Searching the Profiles, available at
http://www.innocenceproject.org/know/Search-Profiles.php?check=check&title=&yearConviction=&
yearExoneration=&jurisdiction=&cause=Eyewitness+Misidentification&perpetrator=&compensation
=&conviction=&x=29&y=0 (listing 186 profiles of individuals wrongly convicted at least in part due
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convicting the guilty thereby promotes, and does not hinder, the legitimate law
enforcement goals of the criminal justice system.
to erroneous identifications, and showing that in 120 of those cases the real perpetrator has yet to be
found).

